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Abstract 
 
The focus of this paper lies on one kind of consequence of party leadership 
primaries, i.e. participation, and more in particular the relative participation rate (i.e. 
the number of effective participants divided by the number of potential participants).  
Based on the mobilization theory, instrumental motivation theory and learning theory, 
we have put forward two hypotheses stating that the first time a party organizes a full 
member vote, participation rates will be higher and that they will decline gradually 
afterwards every time the party is holding a leadership primary.  
We have focused on direct member votes for the selection of the party leader in 
Belgian parties. The focus on Belgium is justified, as almost all parties have been 
organizing direct votes for almost 20 years, which allows for a comparison over time. 
Both leadership votes at the local level and the national level are considered in two 
separate analyses. 
We could not find any statistical significant effects of the number of times a direct 
member vote is held on turnout rates. This leads us to the rejection of both our 
hypotheses. Participation rates to full member votes are not so much influenced by 
how many times such a contest has already been held in a party, but mainly by how 
competitive the contest is.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An increasing number of political parties have recently been changing their internal 
organization, more in particular by giving grassroots members a greater formal say in 
the selection of the party leader (Leduc, 2001; Denham, 2009 ; Kenig, 2009a ; 
Wauters, 2010 ; Cross and Blais, 2012). These developments vary across countries 
and across parties, but seem to constitute nevertheless a clear trend in Western 
political parties.  
The most inclusive way to select a party leader is organizing party primaries in which 
all party members can participate. This phenomenon can be studied from different 
angles: by either focusing on the features, the causes or the consequences of it. In 
this paper, we will evaluate these direct member votes by looking at one type of 
consequences, i.e. their impact on participation. Participation is one of the crucial 
dimensions to evaluate the functioning of direct member votes. This dimension can 
be operationalized by looking either at absolute or relative numbers of participants. 
We focus here on the latter.  
We hypothesize that participation rates in direct member votes will have declined 
over time in relative numbers. It has been demonstrated before that party elites see 
such internal elections predominantly as an element of political marketing (Cross & 
Blais, 2012 ; Wauters, forthcoming). Introducing full member votes is an asset used 
in electoral competition with other parties. This competitive advantage disappears 
after the first elections, and hence, we expect that party elites will pay fewer attention 
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to the functioning of direct members votes, which will have a negative effect on 
participation we expect. On top of that, party elites retain much power in their own 
hands when organizing full member votes. Following the instrumental motivation 
approach, party members are more likely to cast a vote when they can exert real 
influence (Wauters, 2010). Due to a greater awareness over time of limited members’ 
influence (learning effect), we expect that participation rates over time will decline. 
We focus on Belgium, a country in which intra-party democratic procedures have 
been developed very extensively: almost all parties use party primaries to designate 
their leader and they started with it already a few decades ago (Pilet & Wauters, 
forthcoming). This allows us to make a comparison over time, which could have 
predictive power for the evolution of direct members votes in other countries where 
they have been adopted only recently. 
Both the participation rates to leadership elections at the national level as the 
participation to leadership contests at the local level will be scrutinized in this paper. 
For the latter, we will restrict ourselves to the liberal-democratic party, the only party 
in Belgium organizing direct member votes at that level. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we will sketch the development of direct 
member votes in contemporary Western political parties, and we will indicate how 
these developments can be studied. Next, we will highlight participation and we will 
indicate on which theoretical grounds we expect a decline in participation in these 
direct member votes. The next step is an empirical analysis based on Belgian data. 
We end with conclusions. 
 
2. Direct member votes and how to study them? 
 
The main focus in this article will be on leadership elections in which all party 
members have one vote (‘direct member vote’, ‘full member vote’, ‘closed primaries’, 
‘leadership primaries’, ‘one member one vote elections’ often abbreviated as ‘OMOV’, 
are all synonyms). Like candidate selection procedures, these can be studied from 
three different angles: either by focusing on the process leading to their introduction, 
or by directing the attention to particular features of these internal electoral 
procedures, or by concentrating on their effects (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). 
 
Rahat & Hazan (2001) have pointed out that candidate selection methods can be 
classified according to four features: selectorate, candidacy, decentralization and 
voting system. Since the latter two dimensions are not relevant for leadership 
selection, i.e. the selection of one single person at the national level, we will only 
discuss selectorate and candidacy here.  
The selectorate is the body that selects the party leader. More in particular, the 
degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate is important. Inclusiveness can be 
measured by looking at the size of the party agency responsible for the selection of 
the party leader. In order to grasp this variety, a continuum on which leadership 
selection methods are classified according to their degree of inclusiveness is 
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developed (Kenig, 2009a). On the one end point of the continuum, a small elite group 
decides who will become party leader, while at the other end all members, or even all 
(party) voters, are allowed to make this decision. The last few years, many parties 
have clearly moved in the direction of this latter point on the continuum, i.e. towards 
more inclusive methods of leadership selection (Leduc, 2001; Denham, 2009 ; Kenig, 
2009a ; Wauters, 2010 ; Cross and Blais, 2012) 
 
Figure 1: Inclusiveness of leadership selection rules (Kenig, 2009a) 
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The second feature of leadership selection methods, i.e. candidacy, defines who is 
eligible for the post of party leader. Again an inclusiveness-exclusiveness continuum 
can be used. At the inclusive end of the continuum, all members without any further 
requirements could be candidate for the party leadership. At the more exclusive end, 
requirements such as membership seniority (in order to ensure party loyalty), internal 
support from a minimum number of members and/or from local or regional sections, 
or membership of a particular party committee, are imposed as conditions upon 
potential candidates. The higher the barriers imposed by these requirements, the 
more exclusive the leadership selection process will be. 
 
A second way of analyzing leadership selection methods is studying the 
introduction of changes in selectorate and/or candidacy. Studies on the adoption of 
grassroots involvement in the selection of the party leader are scarce, but recently 
growing in number. Most studies provide (anecdotal) evidence about the introduction 
of party primaries in one particular party or country (e.g. Denham, 2009 ; Lisi, 2010)  
Exceptions are formed by the cross-country analysis of Cross & Blais (2012) who 
detect decision-makers and stimuli for the adoption of direct member votes in a large 
number of parties in Westminster countries (the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada) and by the analysis of Wauters (forthcoming) who tries to infer a 
general pattern for consensus democracies from the analysis of Belgian parties. 
A common finding of these studies is that party elites grant more involvement to party 
members when finding themselves in a weak position (electoral defeat, etc.). In order 
to reinforce the party’s (electoral) performance (and/or their own position in the 
party), party leaders adopt more inclusive leadership methods. 
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A final area of research on leadership selection processes is constituted by the 
analysis of their effects. Broadly speaking, five types of effects can be distinguished: 
participation, competitiveness, responsiveness, performance and representation. 
A first element on which particular leadership methods can have an impact is 
participation. This can be interpreted in a quantitative and a qualitative manner 
(Rahat & Hazan, 2006). The former approach focuses on the sheer number of 
participants, which will automatically be higher in procedures with more inclusive 
selectorates. The latter approach takes the quality of participation into consideration: 
the type of members that are participating (Scarrow, 1999 ; Wauters, 2010) or turnout 
rates (the number of actual participants divided by the number of potential 
participants) are analysed.   
A second consequence that can be studied is the competitiveness of the process. 
Several indicators for competitiveness have been used: the number of candidates 
competing for leadership, the difference in vote shares between the winner and the 
runner up, incumbents’ success rate, and the effective number of parties (Kenig, 
2009b). 
Thirdly, responsiveness is another aspect used to assess the consequences of 
leadership selection methods. Responsiveness refers to the agreement between 
members’ opinions and these of the party leader. This aspect is perhaps more 
relevant when analyzing candidate selection methods since party leaders are 
supposed to be consensus builders who stand above internal party quarrels, 
especially if they also aspire to become prime minister (Kenig, 2009b).  
The fourth dimension, on the other hand, i.e. performance, is more important for 
leadership selection than for candidate selection. More inclusive selection procedures 
are supposed to strengthen the legitimation of the party leader, both for internal and 
external purposes (Wauters, forthcoming). This increase in legitimation can be 
evaluated by looking at the length of time party leaders retain their position (Andrews 
& Jackman, 2008). Then the emphasis lies on the internal aspect of performance. 
When focusing more on the external aspect, the relationship between leadership 
selection method and electoral performance can be scrutinized: do party leaders that 
are selected by party members obtain more votes for the party in the next elections? 
Finally, leadership selection procedures can be evaluated by looking at 
representation. A distinction can be made between descriptive representation (or 
‘representation as presence’, e.g. representation of women) and substantive 
representation (or ‘representation of ideas’) (Pitkin, 1967 ; Rahat & Hazan, 2006).  
 
As indicated above, the focus of this paper lies on participation. In the next section, 
we will set out what we understand by participation, why it is important to look at 
participation in leadership primaries, and what factors could influence participation 
rates. This leads us to hypotheses that will be tested in the next sections. 
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3. Participation, theoretical expectations and operationalization 
 
Participation can be evaluated by looking at the absolute number of participants or by 
the relative number. The former approach is automatically connected to the formal 
rules about the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The sheer number of participants is 
evidently higher in full member votes than in a selection procedure decided by a 
small group at the top of the party. (For an analysis using this variable, see Kenig, 
2009 b).  
What is of interest here, however, is the relative number of participants in direct 
member votes: how many of the potential voters effectively cast a vote. We limit 
ourselves to one type of selectorate, i.e. party members, and analyse to what extent 
they make use of the possibility to have a say in the selection of the party leader. We 
will analyse this participation behavior at the aggregate level: the leadership contests 
are the units of analysis, not the individual party members.  
 
Participation is in general seen as an important indicator to measure the democratic 
degree of elections: ‘the health of democracy is often seen in terms of its level of 
turnout’ (Franklin, 2002, p. 148). Electoral procedures are considered more 
democratic when the number of actual participants is high (Dahl, 1989 ; Reeve & 
Ware, 2001) This also applies to elections within political parties where selection 
procedures for party leadership with a high number of participants could be 
considered as more democratic. 
On top of that, one of the official goals to make leadership selection procedures more 
inclusive (for instance by introducing full member votes) is to include a larger number 
of people into the decision-making process. Giving members more power and inciting 
them to become more active is indeed one of the objectives of the introduction of 
leadership primaries (Scarrow, 1999 ; Wauters, forthcoming). If only a few members 
make use of the opportunity to participate, then these goals are clearly not attained. 
Therefore, participation in leadership primaries is important. 
 
We will now indicate from which factors it can be expected from a theoretical 
perspective that they have an impact on turnout levels in leadership primaries. 
Therefore, we rely on general theories about participation. We will also indicate the 
effects of these factors coming forward from analyses of participation in leadership 
primaries on the individual level (Wauters, 2010). Possibly, these findings could be 
inspiring for an analysis on the aggregate level. 
 
A first theory that could be relevant is the mobilization theory. The underlying idea is 
that people who are motivated by others to vote, have a higher chance to cast a vote. 
Social networks (family, friends, neighbors, fellow party members, etc) can exert 
social pressure on individuals to behave as members of a community rather than as 
isolated individuals. People being part of a social environment where going to the 
polls is evaluated positively, will experience implicit or explicit pressure to do the 
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same. Mobilization efforts from party elites (both on the national, regional or local 
level) can incite rank and file members to participate in leadership primaries. 
From an analysis on the individual level, however, it appeared that the local party 
section was not able to make a difference in mobilization: whether a minority of the 
local party members or a majority participates appeared to have no link with the 
participation behavior of individual party members (Wauters, 2010). 
 
A second participation theory is the instrumental motivation theory (Franklin, 2002). 
This theory states that people will participate because they want to have an impact 
on the policy of a state or of an organization. The impression that going to the polls 
can make a difference in the outcome of the elections and in the subsequent policies 
that are pursued, has an influence upon the decision whether or not to cast a vote. 
Previous research on political parties has found out that there is a strong correlation 
between the degree of perceived influence and participation within political parties 
(Seyd & Whiteley, 1998 ; Hillebrand & Zielonka-Goei, 1990 ; Wauters, 2010). 
Members believing that their vote cannot have much influence are less likely to 
participate in leadership primaries.  
On top of that, people who voted in the past are more likely to repeat this action in 
future elections, especially when voting in the past proved to be successful (Geys, 
2006). This correlation is based on the psychological concept of ‘adaptive’ or 
‘reinforcement’ learning (Kanazawa, 2000) that states that voters rather look 
backward instead of forward when making the decision to cast a vote. When they 
have positive experiences with casting a vote, they are more likely to repeat this 
action in the future. Tailored to our research focus here: members who have positive 
experiences with participation in full member votes will be more likely to participate in 
future internal elections. 
 
A third explanatory factor for participation is the competitiveness of the contest. 
Research on parliamentary elections has revealed that there is a strong link with the 
participation rate (Cox & Munger, 1989 ; Fauvelle-Aymar & François, 2006) This link 
can be explained both by voter reactions and elite activity. When the distance 
between contenders is small, the chance that a voter will cast a decisive vote is 
higher, and hence, voters are more motivated to vote (voter reactions). This is 
reinforced by the extra efforts made by candidates to motivate people to vote for 
them (elite activity). Roots for this approach can be found in the rational choice theory 
(Downs, 1957).  
Note that the relationship can also be studied in the reverse direction: Kenig (2009b) 
found that the absolute number of participants (i.e. the selectorate according to the 
formal rules) has a negative impact on the degree of competitiveness. 
 
We will now argue that there are theoretical reasons to assume that these variables 
which are supportive for high participation rates have very high scores the first time a 
party organizes full member votes, but tend to decrease afterwards. 
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In order to come to this argument, we have to go back to the rationale for the 
introduction of direct member votes. Both Cross & Blais (2012) and Wauters 
(forthcoming) state that party elites open up the process of leadership selection when 
finding themselves in an awkward position (after an electoral defeat, after being 
involved in scandals, after being kicked out of government, etc.). The introduction of 
a full member vote is first and foremost a means to reverse the negative atmosphere 
around the party. Direct member votes clearly constitute an element of political 
marketing. Often, the aim is to generate media attention and to propagate via the 
media that the party has broken with the past and has transformed itself into an open 
and modern party. Owing to these goals, it is important to have visible leadership 
primaries which are evaluated positively by the outside world. The ideal scenario is 
large numbers of rank and file members casting a vote in a competitive, but not 
aggressive contest. Therefore, the party elite will do their utmost best to mobilize as 
many members as possible and at the same time they are expected to allow a 
handful of candidates. The first element can be linked to the first theory mentioned 
above: participation will be high when people are being mobilized. It is clear that the 
national party elite will do much effort to mobilize the rank and file the first time they 
organize full member votes. This is the first reason why we expect participation rates 
to be higher the first time. 
Although there are a few examples of parties that have organized leadership 
primaries once and never again (Koole 2012), most of the time once direct member 
votes are introduced, they are there to stay. It is plausible that party elites cannot or 
are not willing to undertake each time as much effort as the first time to mobilize 
members. This element is reinforced by the observation that in reality the impact of 
the rank and file is limited by mechanisms controlled by the party elite. These 
mechanisms include adopting exclusive candidacy rules preventing candidates to 
run, putting forward one preferred candidate, persuading potential candidates not to 
run, etcetera. All these efforts have clearly bore fruit as in almost half of the 
leadership contests in Belgian parties decided by a full member vote, there was only 
one candidate (Pilet & Wauters, forthcoming) and when there were several 
candidates, the average margin between the winner and the runner-up was more 
than 30 %. In sum, the rank and file are offered pro forma involvement, but the real 
decision is often taken elsewhere. If we link this to the instrumental motivation theory 
(people participate if they can have influence) and the learning theory (people 
become gradually aware that their impact is limited), then it can be expected that 
participation will decline after the first direct member vote.    
 
This leads us to two hypotheses.  
 
H1: We expect that participation rates will be higher the first time a party organizes 
direct member votes 
 
H2: We expect that participation rates will decline over time 
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The dependent variable is the relative degree of participation: the number of effective 
participants divided by the number of potential participants. The independent 
variables are, first of all, a dummy variable indicating whether or not it is the first time 
a party organizes a full member vote, and secondly, a variable indicating how many 
times a party has already organized such a vote. 
  
In order to test these hypotheses, we also include control variables in the statistical 
models. 
A first control variable refers to competitiveness. In line with the instrumental 
motivation theory, it can be expected that contests that are highly competitive tend to 
attract a larger number of participants. Therefore, it is important to take this variable 
along in the analysis. Competitiveness can be operationalized in different ways: the 
number of candidates competing for the leadership, the percentage of contests with 
more than one single candidate, and the difference in vote shares between the 
winner and the runner up (Kenig, 2009b) are the indicators we use here, together 
with the effective number of candidates (ENC). This indicator, inspired by Laakso & 
Taagepera’s (1979) indicator to measure the effective number of parties and 
introduced to the study of leadership contests by Kenig (2009b), combines the 
absolute number of candidates and their relative strength in the electoral outcome.  
This is how it is calculated: 
 
    
 
∑   
 
 
Vi is the share of votes of candidate i. 
 
Unlike Kenig, we do not divide this indicator by the number of candidates in order to 
obtain scores between 0 and 1. As indicated above, there are many leadership 
contests in Belgium with only one candidate. If we would divide the index by the 
number of candidates, this will result in scores above 1 for this kind of contests which 
would imply that these contests are the most competitive ones, which is clearly not 
correct.1 
 
Another control variable which could be relevant is the party in which the leadership 
primaries are organized. Some parties are more able to mobilize their members than 
others, and some parties have members that are more eager to participate than 
others. More in particular, we include three party characteristics in our statistical 
analysis. A first one (‘frontrunner’) refers to the party that was the first in its region2 to 
                                                          
1
 This is also recognized by Kenig who excludes contests with only one candidate from his analysis of the ENC. 
Given the fact that contests with only one candidate makes up a large part of all contests in Belgium, we would 
lose a great part of our data if we would do that. 
 
2
 Belgium is a federal country composed of regions and communities. In fact, there are two party systems: a 
Flemish one and a French-speaking one, who operate quite autonomously from each other. Except for the 
bilingual electoral district Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, parties from different party systems do not enter into 
competition with each other.  
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adopt direct member votes. We expect that parties who were frontrunner in their 
region attach more importance to leadership primaries and/or to their image as an 
open party who is able to mobilize a large number of members to cast a vote.  
A second party element is the type of party: it can be expected that mass parties 
given their history, structures and networks are more able to mobilise a larger 
number of members. The archetype of a mass party is often constituted by social-
democratic parties. Therefore, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the contest is held in a social-democratic party. 
Finally, as a sort of general control variable, we include a dummy about the region to 
which the party belongs. As the parties in Flanders and Wallonia are operating in two 
rather distinct party systems, this could have also an effect on participation levels.  
 
 
4. Leadership selection in Belgian political parties 
 
Before starting the empirical analysis, we first give some facts about the position of 
the party leader and his selection process in Belgium. 
The party leader is a crucial and powerful actor in Belgian politics that is 
characterised as a ‘partitocracy’, a democratic system dominated by political parties 
(Fiers, 1998 ; Deschouwer, 2009 ; Pilet & Wauters, forthcoming). The party leader is 
as leader of the organisation responsible for both the internal organisation of the 
party and the external relations and activities of the party, such as acting as 
spokesperson in negotiations and appointing ministers. He almost always coincides 
with the electoral leader, but not with the leader of the parliamentary party which is a 
separate function. When in opposition, the party leader of a major party is the 
candidate to become prime minister or, for smaller parties, to play a key role in a 
future government. For government parties, the incumbent prime minister, a function 
that is in practice never combined with a mandate as party leader, is in general the 
candidate for a new term, but the party leader also plays a prominent role in the 
electoral campaign. All in all, party leaders are powerful actors in Belgian politics, 
only overtrumped in power by the prime minister and deputy prime ministers 
(Dewachter, 2003).  
In the 1970s and 1980s almost all Belgian parties designated their party leader at a 
party conference where delegates could vote. Only the Christian-democratic PSC 
(the predecessor of the CDH) organised at that time already elections with 
participation of all members. Nowadays, almost all parties give their members (and 
only them) the right to vote in party leadership elections. In the beginning of the 
1990s, the radically transformed liberal party VLD introduced as first party in Flanders 
internal elections to designate the party leader (De Winter, 2000). This radical 
transformation including the introduction of far-reaching participatory procedures was 
an answer to the crisis of the political system, the loss of party members and the 
breakthrough of the extreme-right (‘black Sunday’ in 1991), but also a strategy to 
bypass the powerful middle-level elites in the party (including ‘pillarized’ 
organisations) (Wauters, forthcoming). Soon, most other parties followed and by now, 
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almost all Belgian parties use internal elections with member suffrage to assign their 
party leader. By the early 2000s, all democratic parties in Belgium had introduced the 
full members’ vote in their party statutes. This method has become the norm. When a 
new party is created, the system is automatically adopted, as in the case of the new 
party Lijst Dedecker (LDD) which was created a few months before the 2007 federal 
elections. 
 
The fact that full member votes are organized in virtually all Belgian parties and that 
they have been organized since several years, allows us to analyse a dataset with a 
high number of relevant cases. 
 
We will conduct two empirical analyses. 
The first analysis will be conducted on a dataset3 with all local leadership contests in 
the Flemish liberal-democratic party OpenVLD. OpenVLD is the only party in Belgium 
that is organizing every four years full member votes for the selection of the local 
leader and for the local party executive board members. These local internal 
elections were held for the first time in 1993. 
The second dataset contains data on all direct member votes in Belgian political 
parties. We included only those leadership primaries where members could cast a 
vote in a polling booth or by post or internet. Party congresses where all party 
members are granted the right to vote, are excluded from the analysis, as there 
members have to do much more effort to be able to participate. The average 
participation rate to the full member votes at stake here is 39,98 %. 
When there were two rounds to come to a final decision (which is rather uncommon 
although most Belgian parties use a run-off system with a second round organized 
with the two highest scoring candidates if no one obtains an absolute majority in the 
first round (Pilet & Wauters, forthcoming)), only the results and turnout of the second 
round are taken into consideration.  
 
 
5. Empirical analysis: local leadership contests in OpenVLD 
  
We start with the analysis of the leadership contest held at the local level by the 
Flemish liberal-democratic party OpenVLD. 
 
Table 1: Local OpenVLD sections organizing leadership contests at the local level 
 
Year 
Number of local 
section organizing a 
leadership contest 
Percentage of local 
sections organizing 
a leadership contest 
Percentage of local 
sections with 
contests with 2 or 
more candidates 
1993 N/A N/A N/A 
                                                          
3
 We would like to thank Geoffrey Vanderstraeten for gathering these data. 
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1997 N/A N/A N/A 
2001 317 99,06 31,23 
2004 311 96,58 22,83 
2008 233 71,91 17,17 
2010 101 30,98 30,69 
 
Initially, local leadership elections were held together with internal elections for the 
national party leadership and for the national executive board. In all local sections, 
polling booths were installed in order to allow party members to cast their vote for all 
these elections together. After 2004, two changes to the statutory rules has had an 
impact on the practical functioning of local leadership contests.  
A first change is the separation of national and local leadership contests. Local 
leadership contests are now held every three years: two years before the local 
elections in order to have a powerful leader who can manage with a strong hand the 
preparations for the local elections, and one year after the local elections which 
permits the local party to adapt itself following the results of the elections (local party 
leader becoming mayor, local party leader stepping down after an electoral defeat, 
etc). As a consequence, there were local leadership elections in 2008 still according 
to the old rules, and again in 2010, two years before the local elections. 
Another change is that from 2008 onwards it is no longer compulsory for local 
sections to organize leadership contests when there is only one candidate. They can 
still organize them, but they are no longer obliged to. Before, even when there was 
only one candidate, internal elections were always held. The removal of this 
obligation could be seen as an indication of the waning interest of the party elite in 
having visible leadership contests. 
 
As a consequence, local and national leadership contests are no longer organized 
together and not all local sections are obliged to organize them. This has had a 
dramatic negative effect on the percentage of local sections organizing such 
elections: in 2010 only 30% of all local OpenVLD sections organized such elections. 
This decrease is due to the removal of the obligation to hold elections, but the decline 
is so outspoken that it probably also reflects a sort of general gradual decline which 
started already earlier. 
 
Apart from that, a decline in the competitiveness of the contests could be noted: while 
in 2001 still more than 30 % of the contests had two or more candidates, this has 
decreased to less than 17 % of all organized contests in 2008. In 2010, it increased 
again, but this could be explained by the fact that it was no longer compulsory to 
organize leadership contests if there was only one candidate.  
This seems to confirm our thesis of a decline over time of the competitiveness of the 
contests. 
 
Table 2: Participation to the OpenVLD leadership contests at the local level 
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Year 
Number of 
members having 
the opportunity to 
participate 
Number of 
members that 
participates 
General 
participation rate4 
1993 N/A N/A 43,8 
1997 N/A N/A 40,6 
2001 79 044 27 457 34,7 
2004 70 061 28 126 40,2 
2008 53 849 14 049 26,1 
2010 29 790 7 318 24,6 
 
Table 2 indicates that also the participation rates in the local sections that are still 
organizing local leadership contests is declining. While in 1993, the first time 
OpenVLD was organizing local party primaries, the general participation rate was 
43,8 percent, this has decreased to 24,6 % in 2010. This means that over time, the 
turnout at local leadership elections has almost halved. Apart from 2004, when a very 
competitive contest was held at the national level, there is a gradual decline of 
turnout rates. So, not only the number of members that have the opportunity to cast a 
vote decreases (because fewer local sections are organizing leadership contests), 
but also the number of members effectively participating shrinks over time. 
  
The results of the local leadership elections in OpenVLD seem to confirm our 
hypotheses: the first time a party is organizing direct member votes, competitiveness 
and participation tend to be higher compared to the direct member votes organized 
later on. 
 
6. Empirical analysis: all leadership contests 
 
We broaden now our scope by analyzing leadership contests of all parties at the 
national level. 
 
We start by giving some general descriptive statistics about participation to these 
leadership contests. 
From Table 3, it appears that the average turnout rate is (slightly) higher the first time 
a party organizes a leadership primary: 43,56 percent versus 39,39 percent. This 
seems to confirm our first hypothesis that the first time a direct member vote is held 
participation tends to be higher. The difference showed in Table 3 is, however, not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 3: Turnout indicators for direct member votes in Belgian parties, held for the 
first time and not for the first time 
                                                          
4
 Both for 1993 and 1997 estimations based on the turnout rates for the national leadership contest that was 
held the same day and for which could be voted in the same polling booth as for the local leadership contest. 
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 Turnout 
First time 
(N= 7) 
Mean 43,56 
Std. 
Deviation 
15,52 
Not first time  
(N = 42) 
Mean 39,39 
Std. 
Deviation 
12,86 
 
 
In the next table (Table 4), we have run several multiple regression models for 
explaining turnout rates. The central variables are ‘first time’, which indicates whether 
or not it is the first time that leadership primaries are held in that party, and ‘nth time’, 
which is how many times the primaries were already held in that party. We also 
include the control variables set out in section 4. 
 
Table 4: Multiple linear regression models with participation rate as dependent 
variable (standardized beta regression coefficients)5 
 
 Complete 
model 
Model without 
first time 
Complete 
model with sp.a 
Complete 
model with 
limited nth time 
TIME     
First time ,246  ,246 ,200 
Nth time ,384** ,248* ,335**  
Nth time (limited to 5)    ,185 
PARTY     
Social-democratic party ,270* ,265*   
Sp.a   ,416*** ,418*** 
Flemish party -,013 -,031 -,134 -,174 
Frontrunner -,185 -,191 -,174 -,129 
COMPETITVENESS     
ENC ,462*** ,484*** ,472*** ,462*** 
R² 0,27 0,23 0,35 0,30 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p > 0.1 
 
The results of the first model (‘Complete model’ in Table 4) demonstrate that whether 
or not it is the first time that a party organizes a full member vote has an impact on 
the participation rate (beta of ,246), but this effect is not statistically significant. The 
effect of the other variable (nth time) is statistically significant, but the effect goes in 
                                                          
5
 In each model, we tested for multicollinearity by using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). These were all far 
below the critical value of 5. 
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the opposite direction as expected: the participation rate tend to increase when the 
number of times a full member vote was already held increases. This is at odds with 
hypothesis 2. 
From the party variables, only the type of party is significant: social-democratic 
parties are more able than other parties to mobilize party members to cast a vote. 
Finally, competiveness, and the effective number of candidates more in particular, 
has a strong positive effect on turnout rates: the more competitive contests are, the 
higher the number of participants. 
The unexpected positive effect of the variable ‘nth time’ is puzzling. Perhaps, it 
functions as a sort of compensation effect for the (non-significant) effect of ‘first time’. 
Therefore, we also ran a model without this latter variable, but as can be seen in 
Table 4 in the 3th column, ‘nth time’ continues to have a significant effect in the 
direction we did not expect. 
In the third model (‘Complete model with sp.a’) we substitute the variable social-
democratic party by only one particular social-democratic party, i.e. the social-
democratic party in Flanders, sp.a. This party appears to be better in mobilizing its 
members than their French-speaking counterparts of the PS. The effect of this party 
variable is strong and highly significant. 
We remain to grope in the dark as for the explanation of the unexpected effect of ‘nth 
time’. A closer look at our data learns that there is one party, the French-speaking 
Christian-democratic CDH, with already a high number of full member votes, i.e. 11, 
while most other parties have had only around 5 contests. By accident or not, in the 
last CDH contests, a large number of members went to the polls, and this could 
maybe cause bias in our results. Therefore, we also tried to include a more limited 
version of the ‘nth time’ in our model. The highest score on the limited version of this 
variable is 5, meaning that the rank numbers above 5 of the leadership primaries 
were all reduced to 5. When we include this variable in the model (final column in 
Table 4), the effect of this new variable is still positive, but no longer statistically 
significant.6   
 
In sum, based on the multiple regression analysis of all leadership primaries, we 
have to reject our two hypotheses. Participation rates are not statistically higher the 
first time a full member vote is held, nor do they decline as the number of times such 
a vote is held, increases. Competitiveness appears to be a far more stronger 
predictor for participation rates. 
 
 
This throws up the question whether there is a link between competitiveness and 
whether or not it is the first time that full member votes are held. Possibly the 
correlation between these two is responsible for the lack of statistical effect of the 
variable ‘first time’.   
                                                          
6
 This is confirmed if we substitute this new variable by a variable referring to the year the leadership primary 
was held (linked to the idea that party members can also learn from experiences in other parties). This latter 
variable is not significant either. 
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In Table 5, we look at the average scores for a number of indicators of 
competitiveness. Both the number of candidates, the score of the winner and the 
effective number of candidates index show that direct member votes which are held 
for the first time are more competitive than contests organized later on. Moreover, 
contests with more than one candidate are more numerous the first time compared to 
contests that follow later: 71,4 percent of the first time contests had more than one 
candidate, compared to 45,2 percent of the contests organized later on.   
However, none of the differences showed in Table 5 are statistically significant. 
 
Table 5: Competitiveness indicators for direct member votes in Belgian parties, held 
for the first time and not for the first time 
 
 Number of 
candidates 
More than 
one 
candidate 
(%) 
Score of 
the winner 
Effective 
number of 
candidates 
(ENC) 
First time 
(N= 7) 
Mean 2,00 
71,4 
73,63 1,67 
Std. 
Deviation 
1,00 12,20 0,32 
Not first time  
(N = 42) 
Mean 2,45 
45,2 
79,56 1,57 
Std. 
Deviation 
2,86 18,22 0,57 
 
This lack of statistically significant effect of ‘first time’ is confirmed if we run a linear 
regression analysis with effective number of candidates (ENC) as dependent variable 
(see Table 6). ‘First time’ nor ‘nth time’ have a statistical significant effect on this 
competitiveness indicator. This allows us to conclude that competitiveness is not 
significantly higher the first time a party organizes a direct member vote, nor that it 
decreases afterwards. Apparently, presenting and/or allowing many (competitive) 
candidates is not more common the first time party members are granted the 
opportunity to select the leader.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 This comes also forward when we added a centered interaction effect of first time and ENC to the models of 
Table 4. This interaction effect is clearly not significant. 
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Table 6: Multiple regression model with effective number of candidates (ENC) as 
dependent variable (standardized beta regression coefficients) 
 
 Complete 
model 
TIME  
First time -,079 
Nth time -,092 
PARTY  
Social-democratic party ,034 
Flemish party ,091 
Frontrunner ,655*** 
R² 0,39 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p > 0.1 
 
Another element that comes forward here (but that is not particularly relevant for our 
research questions in this paper) is that a party that started as first in their region with 
direct member votes tend to have more competitive contests than parties that 
followed later. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The inclusion of party members in the selection of the party leader is a recent trend in 
contemporary party politics. This phenomenon can studied from different angles. We 
have focused in this paper on one kind of consequence, i.e. participation, and more 
particular on the relative participation rate (i.e. the number of effective participants 
divided by the number of potential participants) of full member votes. 
 
Based on general participation theories, we have put forward two hypotheses stating 
that the first time a party organizes a full member vote, participation rates will be 
higher and that they will decline gradually afterwards every time the party is holding a 
leadership primary. These expectations are based on the mobilization theory (party 
elites are initially very eager to show to the outside world that they are organizing 
direct member votes and are hence doing much effort to mobilize the rank and file) 
and a combination of the instrumental motivation theory and the learning theory 
(members participate when they can have an impact, and they gradually become 
aware that their impact in leadership primaries is limited). 
 
We have focused on direct member votes for the selection of the party leader in 
Belgian parties. The focus on Belgium is justified, as almost all parties have been 
organizing direct votes for almost 20 years, which allows for a comparison over time. 
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Both leadership votes at the local level and the national level are considered in two 
separate analyses. 
 
At first glance, the results seem to confirm our hypotheses but only modestly: 
participation rates are (slightly) higher the first time a party organizes leadership 
primaries and tend to decrease afterwards. However, no statistical significant effects 
could be found. The multiple regression analyses that we have run show that the 
competitiveness of the contest has a large significant impact on the actual 
participation rate. The variables ‘first time’ and ‘nth time’ do not have such a 
significant impact, and for the latter variable even an opposite effect as expected 
could be observed. 
 
This leads us to the rejection of both our hypotheses. Participation rates to full 
member votes are not so much influenced by how many times such a contest is 
already held in a party, but mainly by how competitive the contest is.  
This might be a reassurance for party officials and party members supportive of full 
member votes. These are not threatened in their existence. They do not flash and 
fade out. It seems that once they are introduced and established in a party, they will 
continue to exist and to attract members willing to express their vote.  
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